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LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT: MOVING THE FULCRUM 
PETER WEBB* 
I. INTRODUCTION
While countless articles and commentaries have been published 
about the causes of the 2008 financial crisis, as well as the 
appropriateness of governmental responses, the end result has been a 
heightened concern over the structure, oversight, and stability of the 
largest financial institutions in the United States.1  The clearest example 
of the U.S. Government’s response was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).2  The Dodd-
Frank Act significantly increased regulatory oversight of large banks in 
an effort to increase stability in the complex and interconnected United 
States and global financial systems.3  However, significant changes 
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Group at a major law firm. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not
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as the many colleagues and friends who contributed their time and talent to its production. In
particular, the author thanks Professor John Coyle, Professor Alexa Chew, Professor Melissa
Jacoby, Valerie Hughes, Stephen Kessing, Holland West and Jessica West for their
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1. One of the most significant regulatory changes promulgated in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was the creation of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council and the authorization for it to designate certain banks and other financial 
institutions as “Systemically Important Financial Institutions” or “SIFIs.”  See 12 U.S.C. § 
5463 (2012). 
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); see Helen Cooper, Obama 
Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2010) (“The law subjects more 
financial companies to federal oversight and regulates many derivatives contracts while 
creating a consumer protection regulator and a panel to detect risks to the financial system. . . . 
The law expands federal banking and securities regulation from its focus on banks and public 
markets, subjecting a wider range of financial companies to government oversight.”). 
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
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within large financial institutions and improved oversight thereof have 
proven difficult as the diversity, sophistication, and interconnectedness 
of the modern financial services industry pose increasingly complex 
regulatory challenges.4 
In furtherance of implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, bank 
regulators called for reduced risk in many areas of the financial markets, 
including leveraged lending.5  While leveraged lending is difficult to 
define specifically, it generally encompasses large loans to corporate 
borrowers for the purposes of “mergers and acquisitions, business 
recapitalization and financing, equity buyouts, and business . . . 
expansions.”6  The common attributes of leveraged loans are that they 
involve greater risk because of the size of the loan relative to the 
borrower’s cash flow and they are generally used to finance one-time 
business transactions rather than a company’s ordinary course of business 
activities.7  Such loans obviously increase the amount of debt in a 
company’s capital structure, but therefore can also increase the 
company’s earnings per share or return on equity.8 
Interagency Guidance first published on March 22, 2013 
(“Guidance”), included a general warning against these kinds of loans to 
borrowers with high leverage ratios or other characteristics that might 
indicate an inability of the borrowers to repay the loans.9  The underlying 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Preamble to the Act states its purpose, “[t]o promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” Id. 
4. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Swaps, The Modern Process of Financial Innovation and
the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 341 (1989) (“There is a 
social price to be paid for all this financial innovation. Among other things, these new 
financial products and the underlying process through which they arise and evolve can 
generate enormous risks of virtually unfathomable complexity for the increasingly 
interdependent world capital markets.”); Steven McNamara, Informational Failures in 
Structured Finance and Dodd-Frank’s “Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating 
Agencies,” 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 665, 671 (2012) (describing the “spectacular 
growth in the sophisticated financial products developed on Wall Street over the past 25 
years”). 
5. See Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766 (Mar. 22,
2013). 
6. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Leveraged Lending: Comptroller’s 
Handbook, 1 (Feb. 2008). 
7. See id. at 1–3.
8. Id.
9. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17772.
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rationale for the guidance was to encourage a minimum standard of 
creditworthiness for commercial borrowers and adequate risk 
management by commercial banks.10  These measures, in turn, were 
intended to improve the creditworthiness and stability of the banks that 
held the loans and the market for such debt overall.11 
Commercial banks, however, are not disinterested intermediaries 
but rather for-profit corporations that must answer to shareholders as well 
as to government regulators.  Participating in leveraged lending can 
provide banks additional return to their shareholders.  As capital market 
participants, banks impose higher interest rates and fees on less 
creditworthy and, thus riskier, borrowers.  Furthermore, syndicated 
lending allows commercial banks to act as arrangers by finding other 
lenders and investors to underwrite the various portions of commercial 
loans, thus spreading the risk to multiple parties.12  This means that a 
bank, if arranging but not underwriting an entire loan, may avoid 
exposure to both default and counterparty risk while still collecting fees 
At a minimum, an institutions’ underwriting standards should 
consider . . . borrower’s capacity to repay and ability to de-lever to a 
sustainable level over a reasonable period.  As a general guide, 
institutions also should consider whether base cash flow projections show 
the ability to fully amortize senior secured debt or repay a significant 
portion of total debt over the medium term. Also, projections should 
include one or more realistic downside scenarios that reflect key risks 
identified in the transaction. 
The Guidance was issued jointly by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”).  Id. at 17766. 
10. See Douglas Landy et al., U.S. Bank Regulatory Agencies Issue Final Guidance on
Leveraged Lending Practices: High-level Considerations for Financial Institutions, 28 
BUTTERWORTHS J. OF INT’L BANKING AND FIN. L. 333, 333 (2013) [hereinafter 
BUTTERWORTHS] (“In an effort . . . to address the potential for deteriorating underwriting 
practices by U.S. financial institutions . . . the U.S. federal bank regulatory agencies have 
issued final joint guidance for the Financial Institutions that they supervise and which engage 
in leveraged lending activities.”). 
11. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17772 (“The
originating institution should be mindful of reputational risks associated with poorly 
underwritten transactions, as these risks may find their way into a wide variety of financial 
instruments and exacerbate systemic risks within the general economy.”). 
12. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 6 (“Syndication of
leveraged loans allows originating lenders to serve client needs while at the same time 
ensuring appropriate risk diversification in their permanent loan portfolios.”)  The handbook 
goes on to explain the benefits of syndication to both banks and borrowers. Id. 
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for the arrangement of a leveraged loan.13  Finally, institutional and other 
corporate debt investors have developed an increased appetite for higher 
interest-bearing investments and corporate borrowers have an increasing 
need for capital.14  The cumulative effect of these interests creates 
heightened market pressure on banks to arrange precisely the kinds of 
leveraged loans that government regulators seek to limit.15 
This pressure resulted in increased volume of leveraged loan 
origination from 2009 through 2015.16  The Shared National Credits 
Program 2014 Review (“SNC Program” or “2014 SNC Review”) 
highlighted an increase in leveraged loan activity and the growing gap 
between industry practice and regulator expectations.17  As leveraged 
loan commitments totaled approximately $767 billion 2014 and over one 
trillion dollars in 2015, it is clear that the leveraged loan market is a 
significant component of the U.S. and global financial systems and plays 
a pivotal part in the health of such systems.18  Regulators, therefore, must 
find more effective ways to reduce the systemic risk posed by the 
issuance of these high-risk, leveraged commercial loans. 
This article analyzes the Guidance issued jointly by the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
13. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 6.
14. See, e.g., Six Years of Low Interest Rates in Search of Some Growth, THE ECONOMIST
(Apr. 6, 2013) (“[I]n their desperate search for yield, investors are rediscovering a worrying 
appetite for the kind of structured debt products that many had thought had disappeared for 
good after 2008.”). 
15. See Meredith Coffey, Considerable Confusion: Syndication Loan Market
Sideswiped by Regulation, ABF JOURNAL, (May/June 2014) (“While banks say that the 
regulators are pressuring them not to originate or distribute criticized loans, the market 
appears to be awash with them.”). 
16. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Company,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Shared National Credits Program Review 2014: 
Leveraged Loan Supplement 4 (Nov. 2014) [hereinafter Shared National Credits Program 
Review 2014] (noting significant growth in the leveraged loan market year-on-year); Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Company, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Shared National Credits Program Review 2015 3 (Nov. 2015) 
[hereinafter Shared National Credits Program Review 2015]  (noting a 5.3 percent increase 
in total SNC commitments to $3.9 trillion, and an 18.5 percent increase in Substandard dollar 
volume from 2014, largely due to a downturn in the oil and gas industry). 
17. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16 (“The review . . .
found serious deficiencies in underwriting standards and risk management of leveraged loans. 
Overall, the SNC [Shared National Credits] review showed gaps between industry practices 
and the expectations of safe-and-sound banking articulated in in the 2013 guidance.”). 
18. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16.
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Corporation (“FDIC”), and the Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) and argues 
that such external regulation is not the most effective way of reducing 
risk in the syndicated loan market.  Part II analyzes the Guidance itself.  
Part III looks more closely at recent market trends in leveraged lending.  
Part IV examines the enforcement tools available to regulators when 
enforcing the Guidance.  Part V considers the syndication of leveraged 
loans and the emergence of the leveraged loan market as an alternative to 
high-yield bonds, and draws parallels between the mechanics of loan 
syndication and the sub-prime mortgage market leading up to the 2008 
crisis.  Part VI considers how a self-regulatory body might more 
effectively influence and regulate lending activity by more clearly 
articulating, monitoring and enforcing regulatory expectations. Part VII 
concludes 
II. LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE
The Guidance responded directly to increasingly risky activity in 
the leveraged lending market in 2013 and revised existing regulatory 
guidance.19  This section describes the Guidance in detail, including  the 
regulators’ goals for banks and the particular mechanisms that regulators 
expected banks to implement in order to meet those goals. 
A. Guidance in Context
The overriding concern of regulators is that excessively risky
lending will put bank balance sheets at risk, as well as introduce too much 
risk into the financial system as a whole.20  The Guidance is 
fundamentally a statement from bank regulators expressing an 
expectation that banks change their underwriting and lending practices 
by arranging and issuing fewer high-risk loans to companies with too 
much debt.21  Specifically, the Guidance discourages banks from making 
19. On March 22, 2013, Guidance updated and revised a 2001 Guidance, as well as the
Comptroller’s Handbook for Leveraged Lending, published in 2008. Interagency Guidance 
on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766, 17768 (Mar. 22, 2013); see OCC Bulletin 2001-
18; Board SR Letter 01-9, “Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Financing” (Apr. 9, 2001); 
Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 6 
20. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending,  78 Fed. Reg. at 17770.
21. Id.
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“leveraged loans,” but provides only a general definition of such loans 
and ultimately leaves the precise definition of the term to the banks 
themselves.22  However, the Guidance does list a number of factors that 
banks should consider when crafting an internal working definition of 
leveraged loans and articulating their risk management policies for such 
lending.23  Those factors include: (i) a borrower’s debt to EBITDA ratio; 
(ii) covenant levels; (iii) ability of the borrower to amortize its senior
secured debt and de-lever its balance sheet; (iv) the expectation of
financial support from a deal sponsor and the capacity of such sponsor to
fulfill that expectation; (v) the level of due diligence performed in
evaluating the loan; and (vi) the level of “reliance on enterprise value
and . . . valuation methodologies” employed in evaluating loan
repayment.24
However, the Guidance also suggests that no one of these factors 
will automatically trigger regulatory criticism of a loan and that a loan 
with one or several suspect characteristics might still be appropriate in 
some circumstances.25  For example, when higher leverage ratios are the 
norm in a particular industry, or if there is a well-founded and 
documented reason to believe that a borrower’s income will increase 
dramatically over the term of the loan, a loan with a higher leverage ratio 
or a covenant-lite loan may be appropriate.26  Instead, the Guidance 
22. Id. at 17768.
23. See David A. Brittenham et al., What’s New: Leveraged Lending Guidance, 14
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON PRIVATE EQUITY REP. 1 (Winter 2014) (noting that the Guidance 
suggests that the following loan attributes cause regulatory concern: “(1) the borrower’s total 
leverage ratio of debt to EBITDA exceeds 6:1; (2) the borrower would not pay off roughly 
half of its debt over 5-7 years; (3) typical financial maintenance covenants are not included 
(“covenant-lite loans”); or (4) the borrower may sell or exchange collateral or cash flow 
without lender approval.”). 
24. See 78 Fed. at 17772–73.  Debt to EBITDA is a measure of a company’s debt load
divided by its cash flow, as expressed by EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, 
Depreciation, and Amortization); Katherine Arline, What is EBITDA?, BUS. NEWS DAILY 
(Feb. 25, 2015); See infra notes 45 through 47. 
25. The Guidance states that “[a]t a minimum, an institution’s underwriting standards
should consider” the above mentioned characteristics, but does not go so far as to state that 
any loan with these characteristics shall be subject to regulatory criticism. 78 Fed. Reg. at 
17772 (Mar. 22, 2013). 
26. See Interagency Press Release, Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) for Implementing
March 2013 Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending (Nov. 7, 2014) (released as part of 
the Shared National Credits Report, infra note 60). For further discussion of covenant–lite 
loans, see Allison Collins, Loosening Up with Covenant Lite Loans, AM. BANKER, July 28, 
2014 (“The shift back to covenant-lite loans — which eliminate lender protections such as 
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“set[s] forth in new detail certain expectations with respect to the factors 
a financial institution must consider in its underwriting process.”27  In 
short, the Guidance expresses regulators’ expectation that banks only 
underwrite or issue loans to creditworthy borrowers.28 
B. Outcome and Diligence Focused Approach
Rather than providing clear limits on leveraged loans, the 
Guidance requires that banks issuing leveraged loans adequately evaluate 
the creditworthiness of the borrower and the suitability of each loan.29  
This approach is consistent with prior guidance from banking regulators 
in that it merely requires that banks have systems in place that measure 
and document the risk profile of each credit.30  The Guidance does not 
establish a bright line rule for banks on whether to issue specific kinds of 
leveraged loans and instead prescribes what risk management policies 
must achieve rather than what they must avoid.31 
The Guidance indicates that banks underwriting leveraged loans 
can avoid regulatory scrutiny and criticism by maintaining thorough 
records that reflect an objective evaluation of the risk of such loans.  
Appropriate risk management procedures regarding the issuance of 
leveraged loans include: (i) clear policies articulating a bank’s risk 
appetite for both the issuance and retention of loans; (ii) valuation 
standards for borrowers both at the time of issuance and on an ongoing 
basis throughout the term of the loans; (iii) ongoing management and 
monitoring of deal flow within a bank in general; (iv) accurate and timely 
restrictions on third party debt and ratios governing leverage and interest coverage — 
represents a change for banks, which lately have had the upper hand in lending discussions.”). 
27. Brittenham, supra note 23.
28. Brittenham, supra note 23.
29. See Interagency Press Release, supra note 26 (released as part of the Shared National
Credits Report, infra note 60) (“Institutions should use the characteristics outlined in the 
Guidance as a starting point for developing an institution-specific definition of leveraged 
loans, which takes into account the institution’s individual risk management framework and 
risk appetite.”); see also id. at 2 (“Q2: Are all loans that meet any one common characteristic, 
such as exceeding three times senior debt or four times total debt divided by earning before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), automatically considered 
leveraged? [Answer] No. Leverage is an important indicator, but it should be considered in 
relation to other loan characteristics.”) 
30. Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 6
31. See Interagency Press Release, supra note 26.
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exposure reporting and analytics; and (v) articulated policies for 
analyzing sponsors’ financial support. 32  In short, banks must have 
clearly articulated risk monitoring and risk management policies and the 
decision to underwrite any particular loan must be made within the scope 
of such policies. 
The Guidance requires banks to implement these policies to 
monitor and control the risk levels of not only the loans that they issue 
and loan participations that they purchase, but also loans that they 
underwrite or merely arrange.33  That is to say that banks have an equal 
responsibility to independently assess the creditworthiness of a particular 
credit to a borrower regardless of whether they will maintain the credit 
on their balance sheet. This requirement reflects a shift in the regulatory 
framework as it aims to reduce both risk to the lending bank as well as 
systemic risk to other institutions created by the issuance and syndication 
of risky loans.34  Banks are therefore responsible not only for closely 
monitoring their own exposure to leveraged lending, but also for ensuring 
that high-risk leveraged loans are not issued and disbursed into the greater 
financial system.35 
C. Default Versus Repayment
The Guidance requires banks to primarily consider the likelihood 
of default, rather than the likelihood of loss.36  This is a subtle but 
important distinction, as lenders to a borrower in default may 
nevertheless be paid in full if the lenders’ loans are senior in the 
borrower’s capital structure, and especially if the lenders are fully secured 
32. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766, 17772–75 (Mar.
22, 2013). 
33. See id. at 17772 (“Financial institutions purchasing participations and assignments in
leveraged lending transactions should make a thorough, independent evaluation of the 
transaction and the risks involved before committing any funds.”); Id. (“A financial 
institution’s underwriting standards should be clear, written and measurable, and should 
accurately reflect the institution’s risk appetite for leveraged transactions.”). 
34. See Coffey, supra note 15 (“It appears that the Guidance has a dual mandate. The
first . . . exists to protect the safety and soundness of the banks. . . . The second mandate is to 
ensure that “high risk” loans do not go into the system.”). 
35. See Coffey, supra note 15.
36. See Coffey, supra note 15 (“[T]he leveraged and criticized definitions do not seem to
look at the expected loss of the bank’s position, but rather at the probability that the company 
might default.”). 
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in an asset based loan.37  The Guidance’s more cautious approach reflects 
the general purpose to reduce risk to both banks individually and the 
financial system as a whole.  However, the Guidance’s design also 
constricts banks’ flexibility in offering loans, even loans that are 
collateralized and very likely to be repaid. 
A common metric for evaluating the creditworthiness of a 
borrower is its enterprise value.38  Broadly speaking, evaluating 
enterprise value is the kind of inquiry in which bankers specialize, as the 
feasibility and profitability of commercial loans, mergers and 
acquisitions, and spin-offs all largely depend on what a company is 
actually worth as a whole. The determination of enterprise value is highly 
case-specific, and several methods are often used to arrive at a final 
calculation.  For example, the book value of a company is essentially the 
value of the company’s assets minus liabilities on its balance sheet,39 
while other methods look at the earnings per share that a company has 
been able to produce over a specific period of time and compares those 
earnings to those of similar businesses.40  Finally, analysts might consider 
the liquidation value of the company by valuing solely the company’s 
assets, independent of their use in the business as currently configured.41  
Sometimes a company with multiple business lines may even be worth 
more if broken up than if it continues as a single entity.42  The Guidance, 
however, indicates a general preference for cash flow or income analysis 
as the valuation method over other valuation methods.43  The cash flow 
37. See Coffey, supra note 15 (“Thus, a small, well-structured ABL [Asset Based Loan]
loan sitting atop a leveraged capital structure still may be criticized, even though it is a safe 
loan itself.”). 
38. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17773 (“Institutions
often rely on enterprise value and other intangibles when (1) evaluating the feasibility of a 
loan request; (2) determining the debt reduction potential of planned asset sales; (3) assessing 
a borrower’s ability to access the capital markets; and (4) estimating the strength of a 
secondary source of repayment.”). 
39. See Ian H. Giddy, Methods of Corporate Valuation (Apr. 10, 2015, 11:25 AM),
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/igiddy/valuationmethods.htm. 
40. See id.
41. Howard Rosen, James Nicholson & Jeff Rodgers, Going Concern Versus
Liquidation Valuations, The Impact On Value Maximization In Insolvency Situations, FTI 
CONSULTING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE GRP. (Apr. 10, 2015, 11:33 AM), 
http://www.fticonsulting.com/global2/media/collateral/united-states/going-concern-versus-
liquidation-valuations-the-impact-on-value-maximization-in-insolvency-situations.pdf. 
42. See Giddy, supra note 39.
43. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17773 (“Final
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analysis is preferable because regulators believe that borrowers should be 
expected to pay their debts from cash flow, not from the sale of existing 
assets.  Here again, the Guidance seems to emphasize that banks should 
consider the ability of a borrower to avoid default (not just ultimate loss) 
and repay the loan exclusively with earnings rather than with proceeds 
from assets.44 
Cash flow, however, can be defined in a multiple ways.  Modern 
credit agreements often use earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization expense (“EBITDA”) as a proxy for cash flow.45  More 
recently, however, the defined term “Adjusted EBITDA” has been 
introduced as a measure for cash flow and can include add-backs for one-
time transactions and expenses.46  These adjustments to EBITDA should 
provide a more realistic picture of a borrower’s cash flow going forward, 
but the definition can also be negotiated by the borrower to include add-
backs that may artificially increase its cash flow.47 
D. Pipeline and Information Management
Since banks often commit to funding a leveraged loan before the 
loan is fully syndicated, at any given time a bank will have outstanding 
commitments to fund loans without knowing exactly when the loan will 
estimates [of enterprise value] should be based on the method or methods that give 
supportable and credible result. In many cases, the income method is generally considered the 
most reliable.”). 
44. Regulators’ preference for the use of discounted cash flow analysis suggests that
banks should focus on the borrower’s ability to pay back the loan from income, rather than 
with proceeds from asset sales and other liquidations. See id. 
45. Richard Wight, THE LSTA’S COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE 292–93,
McGraw-Hill, 2009. 
46. See Ningzhong Li, Negotiated Measurement Rules in Debt Contracts, 48 J. OF ACCT.
RES. 1103 (2010); Josef Rashty & John O’Shaughnessy, Reporting Disclosures Using Non-
GAAP Financial Measures, CPA J. 36, 36–38 (Mar. 2014) (describing various adjustments to 
EBITDA in the context of SEC required financial reporting). 
47. See Li, supra note 46; Rashty & O’Shaughnessy, supra note 46 (describing various
adjustments to EBITDA in the context of SEC required financial reporting).  Since credit 
agreements are negotiated contracts, “Adjusted EBITDA” can mean whatever the parties 
agree it should mean and the borrower may negotiate the inclusion of certain revenues into 
the calculation without including the commensurate expenses.  Furthermore, the borrower and 
lender might agree that certain one-time transactions will be included in the calculation of 
Adjusted EBITDA. 
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be issued.48  This process creates a “pipeline” of loans at various stages 
of syndication to which a bank has committed.49 The Guidance requires 
banks to thoroughly implement and document a policy for managing its 
pipeline and credit commitments.50  For example, banks should place 
“limits on aggregate pipeline commitments; limits on the amount of loans 
the institution is willing to retain on its own books . . . and limits on the 
underwriting risk that will be undertaken for amounts intended for 
distribution.”51  In addition to considering the “performance of the 
pipeline against original expectations,” banks should also “conduct 
periodic stress tests on pipeline exposures to quantify the potential impact 
of changing economic and market conditions.”52  While banks monitored 
their loan pipelines before the Guidance was issued, the Guidance 
clarified and emphasized regulators’ concerns regarding deal flow. 
Under the Guidance, banks are also expected to closely monitor 
risky and leveraged loans individually, including non-performing loans.53  
The Guidance requires banks to have Management Information Systems 
in place to ensure that managers and directors are adequately informed of 
credit exposures, including both outstanding credits and those in the 
pipeline.54  Again, the Guidance requires banks to accomplish a certain 
level of monitoring without clearly specifying how banks can 
demonstrate compliance or otherwise providing a safe harbor for banks.55  
Furthermore, “the [a]gencies do not state whether examinations will 
emphasize particular statements in the Guidance more than others,” or 
48. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 6 (describing the
syndication process). 
49. For the purposes of the Guidance, the pipeline includes only committed loan
underwriting and not “best efforts” deals. 
50. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766, 17774 (Mar. 22,
2013); see BUTTERWORTHS, supra note 10 at 333. (“The Guidance emphasizes that a Financial 
Institution should have strong risk management controls over leveraged loan transactions in 
its pipeline, including loans to be held and distributed, in order to avoid incurring material 
losses in a market environment where selling down such loans is difficult.”). 




55. See BUTTERWORTHS, supra note 10, at 336 (“The Agencies do not, however, offer
clarity regarding the manner in which the Guidance will be expected to be practically applied 
to, and affect the availability of, credit provided to borrowers by Financial Institutions.”); 
Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17774. 
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whether the Guidance itself will be the basis of any formal regulatory 
enforcement actions.56  While the requirement for some kind of risk 
management strategy instead of bright line rules defining risky leveraged 
loans provides issuing banks with greater flexibility to tailor loan 
products to borrowers in evolving and dynamic market conditions, it also 
fails to provide predictability regarding regulatory scrutiny, criticism, and 
enforcement.57 
III. REGULATORY REMEDIES
As described above, the Guidance sets out risk management 
expectations in broad terms by describing desired outcomes.  Regulators 
have a variety of tools at their disposal to encourage or require banks to 
achieve those outcomes and observe safe and sound lending practices.  
This section provides an overview of ways in which bank regulators 
initially sought to implement the risk management requirements 
discussed in the previous section. 
A. Loan Ratings
The first consequence of issuing an overly leveraged loan is a
poor loan rating assigned by regulators and, potentially, rating agencies.58  
The Guidance indicates that the rating agencies’ ratings of a borrower 
may not always correspond with regulatory ratings of a loan to that 
borrower.59 Syndicated loans receive one of five ratings from regulators, 
which are divided into two classes, adversely classified and not adversely 
classified. “Pass/satisfactory”60 and “special mention”61 loans are not 
56. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17774.
57. See Coffey, supra note 15 (“Despite being more than a year old as of this writing
[May 2014], there is still mass confusion around what the Leveraged Lending Guidance is 
supposed to do.”). 
58. See Coffey, supra note 15.
59. See BUTTERWORTHS, supra note 10, at 333 (“Notably, borrowers do not appear to be
considered investment-grade by virtue of the ratings assigned to them by credit rating 
agencies . . . [I]t is possible that investment-grade ratings issued to borrowers by credit rating 
agencies are overridden by such tests in the Guidance.”). 
60. See Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6 (“Pass – A 
credit that is in good standing and is not criticized in any way.”). 
61. Id. (“Special mention assets have potential weaknesses that deserve management’s
close attention. If left uncorrected, these potential weaknesses could result in further 
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adversely classified, while loans rated “substandard,”62 “doubtful,”63 or 
“loss”64 are adversely classified.  A “criticized” loan is any loan that is 
not rated “pass.”65  While a single criticized or classified loan may not 
have serious repercussions for a bank that underwrites or arranges many 
loans, the Guidance makes clear that issuing such loans is not advisable.66 
B. Informal and Formal Regulatory Measures
At the institutional level, the various bank regulators have several 
monitoring, compliance, and enforcement tools at their disposal.  
Regulators are expected to communicate frequently with a bank, both 
formally and informally, during the bank’s examination process.67  When 
bank examiners have concerns regarding a bank’s risk profile, those 
concerns must be expressed formally and in writing as “matters requiring 
attention” or “MRA”s.68 Examiners label more serious concerns found 
deterioration of the repayment prospects, or in the institutions’ credit position in the future.  
Special mention assets are not adversely rated and do not expose institutions to sufficient risk 
to warrant adverse rating.”). 
62. Id. (“Loans classified Substandard are inadequately protected by the current sound
worth and paying capacity of the obligor or of the collateral pledged, if any. Substandard 
assets have a well-defined weakness or weaknesses that jeopardize the liquidation of the debt. 
They are characterized by the distinct possibility that the bank will sustain some loss if the 
deficiencies are not corrected.”); see also, FDIC, “How Do Examiners Assign Loan 
Classifications on Your Examination?” 2012 New York Region Directors College 
Monroeville, PA, at slide 4, available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/college/ny/materials/2012-loans.pdf. 
63. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6 (“Doubtful assets
have all of the weaknesses inherent in those classified substandard and when the weaknesses 
make collection or liquidation in full, on the basis of currently known information, highly 
questionable and improbable.”). 
64. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6 (“Assets
classified as Loss are uncollectible and of such little value that their continuance as a bankable 
asset is not warranted. Amounts classified as loss should be promptly charged off. This 
classification does note that there is no recovery or salvage value, but rather that it is not 
practical or desirable to defer writing off these assets even though some value may be 
recovered in the future.”). 
65. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6 (“Criticized
assets include all assets rated special mention, substandard, doubtful, and loss.”). 
66. See supra notes 9 through 11, and accompanying text.
67. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller’s Handbook: Bank
Supervision Process 32 (Jan. 2010) (“Communication should be ongoing throughout the 
supervision process and must be tailored to a bank’s structure and dynamics.”). 
68. See id. at 100 (“Examiners shall describe the practices that resulted in the concerns,
as well as the board’s or management’s commitment to corrective action, in “Matters 
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during an examination as “matters requiring immediate attention” or 
“MRIAs.”69  For instance, Credit Suisse received an MRIA in July 2014 
warning that its underwriting standards did not meet regulators’ 
expectations.70  Reports indicate that other banks have received MRA 
letters regarding leveraged lending activities.71  The Credit Suisse letter 
was intended as a clear message not only to Credit Suisse, but to the entire 
industry  that the Guidance should be taken seriously and that banks 
should change certain facets of their lending practices.72  As one observer 
noted, “[t]he timing of the news - which coincided with Credit Suisse’s 
annual leveraged finance conference in Florida - also raised eyebrows 
and led many to conclude that regulators wanted to make an example of 
the bank and cause it as much embarrassment as possible.”73 Thus, the 
Credit Suisse letter was an informal enforcement action well-calculated 
to send a clear message not just to Credit Suisse, but to makers of 
leveraged loans more generally.74 
Regulators may also employ more serious formal enforcement 
tools.75  Generally, banks that promptly take appropriate measures to 
respond to MRAs or MRIAs will not face formal enforcement actions, 
Requiring Attention” (MRA) in the ROE or in other periodic formal written communication.” 
Id. at 32.); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, An Examiner’s Guide to Problem Bank 
Identification, Rehabilitation, and Resolution 24 (Jan. 2001) (“MRAs should address bank 
practices that ‘deviate from sound fundamental principles and are likely to result in financial 
deterioration if not addressed,’ or that ‘result in substantive noncompliance with laws.’”) 
(internal citations omitted); Ryan Tracy, Feds Win Fight Over Risky-Looking Loans, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2015) (“Starting in late summer [2013], roughly a dozen big banks received a 
Matters Requiring Attention letter from the OCC and Fed . . . Regulators ‘came down and 
started auditing for [lax and inadequate application of the leveraged loan guidelines] – and I 
mean auditing hard, every one of us’). 
69. See Gillian Tan & Ryan Racy, Credit Suisse Loans Draw Fed Scrutiny, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 16, 2014). 
70. Id.
71. See id.; Tessa Walsh & Natalie Harrison, RLPC-IFR-Lenders Cowed by Fed Rebuke
on US Leveraged Loans, REUTERS  (Sept. 30, 2014) (“Although no other banks received 
MRIA letters at the same time as Credit Suisse in July, other Fed-regulated banks also 
received less pressing ‘Matters Requiring Attention’ letters at the same time, two loan bankers 
said.  ‘Other banks have got letters. The reason that Credit Suisse drew comment is that they 
were asked to do something urgently,’ the loan syndicate head said.”).  




75. See Donald R. Glancz & Meredith Boylan, Overview of Federal Bank Enforcement
Actions, VENABLE LLP (2012). 
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but this is not always the case.76  Formal enforcement actions that may 
pertain to leveraged lending include cease and desist orders, formal 
written agreements under U.S. federal law, and Prompt Corrective Action 
Directives.77  To date, no formal enforcement actions have been reported 
that specifically target any single bank’s leveraged lending practices.78 
C. CAMELS Ratings
More broadly, a bank’s leveraged lending activities can have a 
substantial impact on a bank’s CAMELS rating.79  Regulators assess a 
bank’s safety and soundness on a five-point scale, with a score of one 
reflecting “sound in every respect” and five meaning “extremely unsafe 
and unsound.”80  Banks receive a score of one to five in each of six 
categories: “capital adequacy, asset quality, management capability, 
earnings quantity and quality, the adequacy of liquidity, and sensitivity 
to market risk” (thus, “CAMELS”).81  Finally, “[c]omposite ratings are 
based on a careful evaluation of an institution’s managerial, operational, 
financial, and compliance performance.”82 
Noncompliance with the Leveraged Lending Guidance may 
76. Id.; see OCC PPM 5310-3 at 8 (Sept. 9, 2011).
77. A PCA Directive would likely only be appropriate if a bank was undercapitalized
and seems a disproportionate response to merely issuing overly-leveraged loans. See 
Comptroller of Currency. OCC 2011-37 and PPM 5310-3 (REV) at 5 (Sept. 9, 2011).  
PCA actions are triggered by a bank’s capital category as defined in 12 
USC 1831o, 12 CFR 6, and 12 CFR 165 Depending on a bank’s PCA 
capital category, certain restrictions and actions are automatically 
imposed by operation of law. Discretionary PCA actions include the 
issuance of directives that impose actions or restrictions permitted or 
otherwise required under 12 USC 1831o, 12 CFR 6, and 12 CFR 165. 
Except in rare instances, the OCC provides prior notice of intent to issue 
a PCA directive. Unlike some other enforcement actions, there is no 
provision for an administrative hearing prior to the issuance of PCA 
directives. 
78. See Walsh & Harrison, supra note 71. The fact that the MRIA letter received by
Credit Suisse came as such a shock to market participants suggests that no more serious action 
has yet been taken by regulators. See Harrison, supra note 70 (“This [letter to Credit Suisse] 
is the first evidence in the market. It will absolutely have an effect. All risk managers will say 
‘thank God it’s not us, and let’s look at it to make sure we’re not in the public eye’.”). 
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affect a bank’s CAMELS rating in several ways.  First, when a bank holds 
portions of leveraged loans that it has underwritten, or when a bank 
purchases leveraged loan participations, the quality of those assets will 
be directly reflected in the bank’s asset quality score.83  In fact, one of the 
key factors in assessing asset quality is the “adequacy of underwriting 
standards,” which is the precise focus of the Guidance.84  Criticized loans 
are so rated, because they are considered poor quality assets.85  What the 
Guidance leaves ambiguous, however, is what amount of criticized loans 
might impact a bank’s asset quality score, as the Guidance includes very 
few concrete metrics.86 
The Guidance does note that lenders should consider the ability 
of borrowers to make payments on time even during an economic 
downturn, which speaks specifically to the assessment of market risk over 
the life of the loan.87  While, for example, a leverage level of 6X as 
measured by debt to EBITDA triggers increased scrutiny, the Guidance’s 
actual requirements are difficult to define concretely.88  There are no 
guarantees that a bank’s normal and downside projections will be 
consistent with regulators’ projections at the time of examination as 
market conditions can change rapidly, and small quantitative differences 
in assumptions can lead to very different projections over a five to seven 
year period.89  Thus, while a bank’s leveraged loan exposure can be a 
83. See id. at 754 (“The asset quality rating reflects the quantity of existing and potential
credit risk associated with the loan and investment portfolios, other real estate owned, and 
other assets, as well as off-balance sheet transactions.”). 
84. Id. (“The asset quality of a financial institution is rated based upon . . . assessment
of the following evaluation factors: The adequacy of underwriting standards, soundness of 
credit administration practices, and appropriateness of risk identification practices. . .”). 
85. See supra notes 58 through 66, and accompanying text.
86. The Guidance and accompanying FAQ make clear that debt to EBITDA ratios of 6X
and greater will automatically draw increased regulatory scrutiny, as will the inability of a 
borrower to amortize 50 percent of a loan within seven years, but carrying a marginal volume 
of such loans, on its own, will not cause a bank’s asset quality score to drop. See Interagency 
Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766, 17772–73 (Mar. 22, 2013). 
87. See Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg at 17773 (“Stress
tests of enterprise values and their underlying assumptions should be conducted and 
documented at origination of the transaction and periodically thereafter, incorporating the 
actual performance of the borrower and any adjustments to projections.”). 
88. See supra notes 30, 53 through 57, and accompanying text. While the Guidance does
require banks to model downside scenarios, it does not include parameters for creating such 
models. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending 78 Fed. Reg. at 17774. 
89. See supra notes 30, 53 through 57, and accompanying text.
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significant part of its overall risk exposure, the Guidance leaves it to each 
bank to develop its own policies for managing this exposure, while only 
providing abstract parameters for what those policies must achieve. 
For example, the Guidance goes to great lengths in describing the 
management requirements for banks engaged in leveraged lending.90  As 
discussed earlier, it requires that institutions have Management 
Information Systems to ensure that managers have all the necessary 
information to adequately monitor the institutions’ leveraged lending 
exposures.91  Thus, the management component of an institution’s 
CAMELS rating is the most appropriate area for regulators to reflect a 
bank’s compliance or noncompliance with this aspect of the Guidance. 
Leveraged lending can also impact a bank’s liquidity, because 
even a relatively small decrease in the cash flow of a heavily leveraged 
borrower can seriously affect its ability to make debt service payments 
on time.  In an economy-wide slowdown, this can potentially put a bank 
in a serious capital or liquidity situation.  This fact became abundantly 
clear during the 2008 financial crisis as the uptick in mortgage defaults 
sent ripple effects throughout the financial system.92  Therefore, the 
extent of a bank’s participation in the leveraged lending market can 
significantly impact its liquidity score in its CAMELS rating. The 
Guidance requires that banks have “[w]ritten policies and procedures for 
defining and managing distribution failures and ‘hung’ deals, which are 
identified by an inability to sell down the exposure within a reasonable 
period (generally 90 days from transaction closing).”93  Inadequate 
pipeline management resulting in either too many hung deals or simply 
90. See supra notes 30, 53 through 57, and accompanying text. Each section of the
Guidance outlines the diligence and management requirements for institutions arranging and 
underwriting leveraged loans. For example, “A financial institution’s management should 
receive comprehensive reports about the characteristics and trends in such exposures at least 
quarterly, and summaries should be provided to the institution’s board of directors.” Id. at 
17774. 
91. See supra notes 48 through 52, and accompanying text.
92. See William W. Land & Julapa A. Jagtiani, The Mortgage and Financial Crises: The
Role of Credit Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 38 ATL. ECON. J. 295, 296–305 
(describing first phase of the Financial Crisis and noting, with the respect to financial 
institutions investment in Residential Mortgage-backed Securities, “[w]ith this market 
collapsing and because of doubts about counterparties’ creditworthiness due to large but 
unquantified exposure to the mortgage market, many large financial firms faced a severe 
liquidity squeeze that threatened their survival.”). 
93. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17773.
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committing financing for too many deals could also certainly affect a 
bank’s liquidity rating. 
While the Guidance does not have the force and effect of agency 
regulation, let alone a statutory mandate, not complying with the 
Guidance can have a wide range of consequences for banks.  Banks have 
already seen regulators take informal measures during their CAMELS 
rating examinations, including the MRIA letter to Credit Suisse.94  As of 
January 2016, it appears unlikely that any formal enforcement action, 
such as a cease and desist order, will result from issuing criticized loans.95  
Bank regulators appear to generally approve of the most recent changes 
in underwriting standards.96  However, issuing loans that warrant 
regulatory criticism can still adversely affect a bank’s CAMELS rating in 
several ways ranging from lower CAMELS scores to MRIA or MRA 
letters.  While these are regarded as effective regulatory remedies to 
ensure compliance, the opacity of the Guidance’s requirements poses a 
challenge to implementation. 
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GUIDANCE
Despite the fact that regulators have a myriad of regulatory tools 
at their disposal to implement the Guidance, it took nearly two years for 
the volume of leveraged loans and average leverage ratios to drop in the 
syndicated loan market, and regulators continue to express concern about 
leveraged lending practices generally.  The Guidance, although issued in 
March 2013, generally had little impact on bank lending practices until 
late 2014,97 and after a brief correction in 2015 there is renewed concern 
94. See Tan & Racy, supra note 69; Walsh & Harrison, supra note 71.
95. The reaction to the Credit Suisse MRIA letter suggests that it was considered a
dramatic step. Id. Still, the SNC Leveraged Loan Supplement suggests that regulators will be 
looking more closely at banks’ leveraged lending activity. See Shared National Credits 
Program Review 2014, supra note 16 (“The agencies believe that an institution unwilling or 
unable to implement strong risk management processes will incur significant risks and should 
cease their participation in this type of lending until their processes improve sufficiently.  As 
a result of the recent SNC leveraged lending findings, supervisors will increase the frequency 
of reviews around this business line to ensure risks are well understood and well controlled.”) 
96. Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16, at  3 (“Examiners
noted improved compliance with underwriting expectations with regard to the 2013 leveraged 
lending guidance and subsequent frequently asked question documents.  However, gaps 
between industry practices and the guidance remain.” 
97. See, e.g., Sean Jones, U.S. Bank Regulators to Enforce Stricter Discipline on
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regarding underwriting standards.98  This section takes a closer look at 
how individual banks and the market as a whole have responded to the 
Guidance since its issuance. 
A. Inconsistent Application of Guidance By Different Regulators
Since the Guidance did not provide bright line rules defining, 
prohibiting, or even classifying leveraged loans, many banks struggled to 
understand and implement the Guidance,99 and leveraged lending 
continued to grow well into 2014.100  In addition, enforcement of the 
Guidance was uneven across the various bank regulators. According to 
industry insiders, “the OCC . . . more frequently contact[ed] banks about 
the issue and . . . OCC-regulated banks also received more verbal 
warnings as well as official letters demanding fixes than banks that are 
regulated just by the Fed.”101  It seemed, for a time, that leveraged lenders 
might exploit agency differences in implementation through regulatory 
arbitrage and take advantage of the Fed’s more lax enforcement.102  
Finally, the lack of clarity may have led many banks to decline making 
loans that may have been appropriate, thus pushing borrowers toward less 
regulated non-bank lenders.103  As a result, some leveraged lending may 
have moved into other sectors of the financial markets like “shadow 
Leveraged Lending, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE  (Aug. 12, 2014) (“There is no sign yet of a 
reversal in the general trend towards weaker covenants, larger credit lines, narrower pricing 
and other indications of slacker underwriting . . .”). 
98. See Craig Torres & Nabila Ahmad, Wall Street Listens as Fed Wards on Risky Loans,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2015); Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16, 
at 3 (Nov. 2015); Sridhar Natarajan, Wall Street Regulators Said to Step Up Leveraged-Loan 
Focus, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 20, 2015). 
99. See Coffey, supra note 15; Kristen Haunss, Fed Said to Work with OCC to Clarify
Leveraged-Loan Guidance, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12, 2014). 
100. See Gillian Tan, Debt Rises in Leveraged Buyouts Despite Warnings, THE WALL ST.
J. (May 20, 2014) (“Wall Street banks are financing more private-equity takeovers with higher
levels of debt, despite warnings by regulators to reduce the amount of risky loans they make.”)
101. Lauren LaCapra & Greg Roumeliotis, Update 1 -Insight- Fed, OCC Differ in
Enforcing Leveraged Lending Guidelines, THOMSON REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2014). 
102. See id. (“Some sources said that it could create conditions that could eventually push
risky lending entirely out of the regulated banking sector and into the lightly-regulated realm 
of shadow banking, consisting of firms such as private equity and hedge funds.”) 
103. See Tom Braithwaite et al., Leveraged Loan Crackdown Drives Borrowers to
‘Shadow Banks,’ FIN. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014); see also Kelly Thompson, Leveraged Loans: 
Banks’ Share of Middle Market Pie Shrinks Further in 2013, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2014). 
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banks” including Jeffries and other financial institutions not subject to the 
same regulatory oversight as nationally or state chartered banks.104  While 
such a shift would reduce leveraged lending risk to chartered banks, it 
would also entail reduced regulation of the market as a whole, at least by 
bank regulators.105 
One indication of the confusion caused by the Guidance is the 
number of client alerts published by Wall Street law firms, which as of 
January 2016 include no less than five devoted entirely to the 
Guidance.106  Anecdotal evidence suggests that bank managers and 
directors continued to ask counsel to review the application of the 
Guidance as late as July 2014, over a year after its publication.107  The 
Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, Reuters, and other news outlets also 
published numerous articles and commentaries on the meaning and 
significance of the Guidance.108 
B. Shared National Credits Review: A Report Card For Leveraged
Lending
The clearest indication of the Guidance’s effectiveness, however, 
is the number and volume of leveraged loans issued by banks.  An 
examination of the 2014 Shared National Credits Review (“2014 
104. See Walsh & Harrison, supra note 71 (referring to the tightening of credit and noting
that “[t]his could force some borrowers into the shadow banking market.”).  Jefferies, for 
example, is a pure investment bank and not a commercial bank, and therefore largely regulated 
by the SEC and not the Fed, OCC or FDIC. 
105. See Walsh & Harrison, supra note 71.
106. See Bank Regulators Issue Guidance on Leveraged Lending, CAHILL GORDON & 
REINDEL LLP (Apr. 12, 2012); David A. Brittenham et al., What’s New: Leveraged Lending 
Guidance, 14 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT No. 1 (2014); Federal 
Banking Agencies Revamp Guidance on Leveraged Lending, SIMPSON THATCHER & 
BARTLETT, LLP (Mar. 27, 2013); David C. Reamer et al., Bank Regulators Eye Leveraged 
Lending, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES (Jan. 16, 2014) 
Cephas, Derrick and Dimia Fogam, Bank Regulators Tackle Leveraged Lending, WEIL 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM CENTER (Mar. 2013). 
107. At one firm, additional research into the Guidance was assigned as a project to
summer associates as late as July 2014. 
108. See, e.g., Pedro Nicolaci de Costa, Fed Wants Better Compliance on Leveraged Loan
Guidelines, Report Says, WALL ST. J., (July 15, 2014); Haunss, supra note 99; Coffey, supra 
note 15; Greg Roumeliotis, U.S. Fed Warns of More Bank Scrutiny Over Leveraged Lending, 
THOMSON REUTERS (May 13, 2014). 
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Review”), a thorough annual analysis of outstanding credits, published 
by the Fed, the FDIC, and the OCC, revealed that leveraged lending 
continued to grow in the year following publication of the Guidance.109  
The 2014 Review noted that the deficiencies in underwriting and risk 
management standards, implementation, and controls persisted in the 
leveraged lending market, and that the volume of higher risk loans had 
increased substantially and continuously since 2009.110  Part 33 of the 
2014 Review concisely summarized the trends in syndicated loan 
underwriting: 
The SNC examination noted weak underwriting 
standards in 31 percent of the loan transactions sampled. 
This percentage compared unfavorably to 2012, 2011, 
2010 and 2009 percentages of 24 percent, 19 percent, 16 
percent and 13 percent, respectively. Leveraged lending 
transactions were the primary driver of this deterioration. 
The most frequently cited underwriting deficiencies . . . 
were minimal or no loan covenants, liberal repayment 
terms, repayment dependent on refinancing, and 
inadequate collateral valuations. The weak underwriting 
structures were in part attributable to aggressive 
competition and market liquidity.111 
The 2014 Review even included a “Leveraged Loan Supplement” 
(“Supplement”), as regulators paid particular attention to leveraged loans 
in the 2014 SNC Review specifically to measure the effectiveness of the 
109. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 4–5; see also Joint
Press Release by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Company, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Credit Risk in the Shared National 
Credits Portfolio is High; Leveraged Lending Remains a Concern (Nov. 17, 2014) (noting 
“serious deficiencies in underwriting standards and risk management of leveraged loans.”). 
110. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 4.  Note that while
the SNC Review does not specifically define the term, “syndicated loans” generally refers to 
loans underwritten by multiple banks, while “leveraged loans” refers to a subset of syndicated 
loans that are considered more risky due to the debt burden on the borrower. See 
LEVERAGEDLOAN.COM, http://www.leveragedloan.com/primer/#!how-are-loans-syndicated 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
111. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 9.  The Review
also includes a more detailed chart of classified and criticized loan percentages from 1989 to 
2014 at page 10. 
112 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 20 
2013 Guidance.112  Bank regulators concluded that the Guidance had not 
been fully heeded and expressed concern at the level of risk persisting in 
the leveraged loan market.113  The Supplement concluded that banks had 
merely reduced interest rates and extended maturities to accommodate 
overly-leveraged borrowers.  This meant that banks were receiving 
reduced returns on higher-risk loans, although these measures did ease 
the debt burden on borrowers, making default less likely only for the short 
term..114  Instead, regulators would have preferred to see banks take more 
substantive steps to require or assist borrowers in de-levering their 
balance sheets.115  These might include “implementation of new 
covenants or tightening existing covenants; equity injections; line 
reduction; step-ups to a term loan A structure with increased 
amortization; the addition of collateral; [and] restrictions on new 
acquisitions or issuance of additional debt.”116  The Supplement also 
noted that banks should more diligently document their efforts to support 
the credits they issue.117 
Finally, the quantitative analysis in the 2014 SNC Review and the 
Supplement showed continued growth in the leveraged loan market, and 
particularly in more leveraged and risky credits.118  “[O]nly 77 percent of 
borrowers are projected to repay 50 percent of total debt within seven 
years, compared to 83 percent prior to June 1, 2013. . . [and] 15 percent 
of [leveraged loan] transactions showed leverage in excess of 8.0X.”119  
The final paragraph of the Supplement noted that the increasing volume 
112. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 9.
113. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6 (“While
institutions have formally addressed many of the risk management issues noted in the 
guidance, execution and full implementation has not been achieved.”). 
114. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 5 (“Steps taken by
institutions to strengthen non-pass credits were generally limited to a reduction in interest rate 
or an extension of maturity, which are insufficient for meeting supervisors’ expectations for 
such credits.”). 
115. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 5 (“The agencies
expect a strategy that actively pursues and executes meaningful improvements in structure or 
controls during the refinancing of a non-pass borrower.”) 
116. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 5.
117. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 5 (“[E]xaminers
noted that institutions frequently did not identify and document efforts to strengthen these 
[special mention] credits.”). 
118. See Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6–7.
119. See Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6–7.
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of poor quality loans increased systemic risk in credit markets as a 
whole,120 and regulators indicated that they would step up their 
monitoring efforts in leveraged lending and might even try to prevent 
institutions from participating in the market if they did not meet the 
expectations outlined in the Guidance.121 
It was unsurprising that the 2014 SNC Review finally clarified 
the Guidance.  As Meredith Coffey of the Loan Syndications and Trading 
Association (“LSTA”) pointed out in May of 2014, over a year after the 
Guidance was issued: 
[M]ost market participants say that the banks need to go
through another SNC exam to determine just how much
they are punished for underwriting or holding criticized
loans. Once that cycle has ended in summer 2014, the
market may have more clarity on just what is expected
from the Leveraged Lending Guidance.122
This perspective reflects not only the lack of clarity regarding regulators’ 
expectations for implementation of the Guidance, but also a sense that 
market participants still needed to know what was at stake for 
noncompliance. 
The 2014 SNC Review provided a report card of sorts for the 
leveraged lending market, and banks have since responded by reducing 
leveraged lending to comply with the Guidance.123  During the fourth 
quarter of 2014, “[d]ebt levels for companies funding takeovers in the 
leveraged-loan market fell . . . for only the second time since 2012.”124  
In the first quarter of 2015, the leveraged loan market was down 69 
120. See Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 7.
121. See Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 7 (“The
agencies believe that an institution unwilling or unable to implement strong risk management 
processes will incur significant risks and should cease their participation in this type of 
lending until their processes improve sufficiently. As a result of the recent SNC leveraged 
lending findings, supervisors will increase the frequency of reviews around his business line 
to ensure risks are well understood and well controlled.”). 
122. Coffey, supra note 15.
123. See Matthew Heller, Leveraged Lending Pullback Tied to Regulatory Scrutiny, CFO
(Oct. 23, 2014) http://ww2.cfo.com/credit/2014/10/leveraged-lending-pullback-tied-
regulatory-scrutiny/. 
124. Id.
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percent from 2014, and the drop has been at least partially attributed to 
the Guidance.125  Standard & Poor’s also noted that the average debt-to-
EBITDA ratio for large leveraged buyouts dropped below the 6X 
threshold, from a high of 6.3X in September 2014 to 5.6X in March 
2015.126 Thus, although it took over 18 months from the publication of 
the Guidance, it appeared that the Guidance was beginning to effectively 
moderate banks’ leveraged lending activities and perhaps even improve 
the quality of commercial credit and thus moderate risk in the financial 
system as a whole. 
The more recent Shared National Credits Program 2015 Review 
(“2015 SNC Review”) presented only marginally improved market 
conditions, noting “36.1 percent of leveraged transactions originated 
within the past year exhibited structures that were cited as weak by 
examiners.”127  The 2015 SNC Review included a smaller cross-section 
of the leveraged lending market and noted that while underwriting 
standards seemed to improve in the latter half of the year, many of the 
same troubling characteristics of leveraged loans have continued to 
persist, including borrowers’ inability to de-lever and reduce financial 
covenants.128  Incremental facilities and other “accordion features” which 
contemplate additional post-closing borrowings were also a principal 
concern, though much of the report is devoted to challenges facing the oil 
and gas sector due to dramatic drop in oil prices following years of rapid 
expansion in the industry.129 
Following the 2015 SNC Review, federal regulators have 
renewed their focus on leveraged lending, which suggests that the 
Guidance and other regulatory measures have failed to adequately 
125. Christine Idzelis, Leveraged-Loan Sales Slump To Worst Since 2010 on Fed
Scrutiny, [2015] BANKING DAILY (BNA) NO. 67 (Apr. 8, 2015). 
126. Id.
127. Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16, at 3.
128. Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16, at 9.
129. Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16, at 9 (“Incremental
facilities have been included in loan agreements for a number of years, but are drawing 
attention because of their increased usage in conjunction with relaxation of other structural 
elements such as covenants and restricted payments.”); Id. at 10 (noting challenges that oil 
and gas companies face and that “the significant decreases in [oil and gas] market prices have 
impaired many [oil and gas] companies’ ability to pay interest and principal, and has led to 
some defaults.”) 
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improve underwriting standards.130  Regulators now plan to conduct the 
Shared National Credits Review biannually, instead of annually, and 
several major commercial banks are already facing renewed scrutiny of 
their leveraged lending and underwriting practices.131  In addition, some 
signs indicate that the market itself is losing its appetite for riskier 
loans.132 This suggests that even if bank underwriting standards improve 
going forward, it will be due to market pressure, rather than regulatory 
cajoling. 
V. SYNDICATION ISSUES
The commercial banking and financial services industry has 
evolved in a number of ways over the last several decades and syndicated 
lending is just one example of innovation in the industry.  This section 
describes the convergence of syndicated lending and high-yield bond 
products and goes on to describe the market conditions that have driven 
this evolution.  Finally, the section describes some parallels between 
syndicated lending and the sub-prime lending markets. 
A. Convergence of Bond and Credit Agreement Structures
Banks generally syndicate large leveraged loans, meaning the
loans are underwritten and held by multiple banks and investors rather 
than issued and held exclusively by the arranging bank or banks.  This 
has several important implications in today’s economic climate and 
interconnected financial market structure. Over the last two decades, non-
banks have started to play a much more significant role in the syndicated 
lending market.133  Non-banks can participate in both the initial syndicate 
of lenders and purchase participations in a syndicated loan from an initial 
lender.134 Furthermore, banks and other financial institutions can buy and 
130. Natarajan, supra note 98 (describing trends in the leveraged lending market from
2009 to Q3 of 2015). 
131. Natarajan, supra note 98.
132. See Natarajan, supra note 98 (noting that “a group of lenders led by Bank of America
Corp. and Morgan Stanley postponed a $5.5 billion debt package backing the biggest 
leveraged buyout of the year after struggling to sell the debt to investors.”). 
133. Wight, supra note 45.
134. See generally, Loan Syndication and Trading Association website:
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sell participations in syndicated loans on a fairly active market.135  Thus, 
the syndicated loan market has begun to resemble the corporate bond 
market and leveraged lending has become an alternative to high-yield 
bond issuance. 
Similarly, the documentation and features of many syndicated 
loans, specifically term loans,136 has begun to resemble high-yield bond 
indentures.137 For example, borrowers began negotiating more flexible 
lender protections through mechanisms like “baskets,” which allow 
certain uses of cash flow or additional debt, dividend payments by the 
borrower, and the designation of unrestricted subsidiaries (subsidiaries 
which are not obligors under the loan documents).138  Credit Agreements 
have become more heavily negotiated contracts, like bond indentures, 
and in some ways the primary difference between high-yield bonds and 
leveraged loans is merely that bonds trade in much smaller denominations 
and are therefore more liquid. Over time, the increased participation of 
non-bank entities on the lender side of the syndicated lending market has 
both increased lender-side demand for the instruments while also eroding 
lender protections, which has also caused a convergence in terms for bank 
and bond debt.139 
B. Low Interest Rates Have Driven Investors into Riskier
Investments
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, interest rates 
remained at or near historic lows for over six years with the Fed 
announcing only a one quarter of a percent increase above the near-zero 
Federal Funds Rate on December 16, 2016.140  With only modest growth 
http://www.lsta.org/about (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (the LSTA’s website includes a wealth 
of current information regarding the U.S. syndicated loan market) 
135. Id.
136. Wight, supra note 45, at 7–8. Syndicated loans take many forms, from revolving
credits that function much like a corporate credit card to amortizing term loans (historically 
“tranche A” loans). Id. Historically, non-banks have invested in “tranche B” loans with 
feautres like nominal amortization and longer maturity. Id. 
137. See, e.g., Maura O’Sullivan and Benjamin Cheng, TERM LOANS AND HIGH YIELD 
BONDS: TRACKING THE CONVERGENCE, Practical Law 60, 62–63 (July/Aug. 2012). 
138. Id.
139. See id.; Wight, supra note 45, at 7–8.
140. See, e.g., John Carney, The Fed’s Rate Increase: A New Test Looms, WALL ST. J.
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in the U.S. economy and anemic growth and recession fears elsewhere in 
the world, the Fed still seems hesitant to raise interest rates dramatically 
following the December 2015 increase.141  Low interest rates generally 
encourage individuals and businesses to invest, as low yields on bank 
deposits discourage saving.142  However, “[e]xcessively low rates help to 
create bubbles because they allow investors to ignore the cost of 
financing and concentrate on the capital gains if their strategy works; they 
let people forget risk and focus too much on reward.”143 
The extended period of low interest rates has resulted in 
concentrated risk in a lower range of rates of return.144  For example, The 
Economist noted in 2013 that “[c]ompanies with a junk-bond rating are 
able to borrow at a rate that is four percentage points below the post-2000 
average, according to Citigroup . . . whereas a typical investment-grade 
company, ranked A, can borrow at 2.4% compared with an historical 
norm of 5.1%.”145  Investors, particularly large institutional investors like 
public and private pension funds that must keep pace with their 
pensioners’ entitlements, must meet target rates of return that necessarily 
reflect more  risky today than ten years ago. Thus, while an investor could 
hit its target rate of return in A-rated debt in 2004, that investor must now 
invest in lower-rated (and thus riskier) debt to make the same return. 
C. Parallels With the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
Today banks are acting, as they always have, as intermediaries 
between parties that have liquid capital and those that need liquid capital.  
As arrangers of syndicated loans, banks are able to match institutional 
investors with corporate borrowers in need of financing. In the extended 
period of low interest rates, however, both corporate borrowers and 
institutional investors are clamoring for more loans—investors because 
(Dec. 16, 2015); Six Years of Low Interest Rates, supra note 14. 
141. See Jon Hilsenrath & Ben Leubsdorf, Fed Divided on June Rate Increase, but Soft
Data May Prove Deciding Factor, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2015) (“While ‘several’ officials 
thought June would be the right time to raise rates, others thought it would be better to wait 




145. Six Years of Low Interest Rates, supra note 14.
118 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 20 
they have fewer options for even modest returns,146 and borrowers 
because borrowing at a low rate of interest can facilitate expansion, as 
well as improve return on equity by increasing the amount of debt (and 
thus leverage) in a capital structure.147  Furthermore, banks are even more 
directly incentivized to issue leveraged loans because they are able to 
collect higher fees and interest for arranging and underwriting the loans, 
particularly riskier loans.148 
Structurally, at least, the current market dynamic is alarmingly 
similar to the mortgage-backed securities market prior to the 2008 
financial crisis.149  In the early-to-mid 2000s, mortgage originators wrote 
mortgage loans to borrowers without a demonstrated ability to repay the 
loan, depending instead on such borrowers’ ability to refinance or the 
lender’s ability to recover their value through foreclosure and resale.150  
Originators were not concerned with whether the loans were eventually 
paid in full because of their ability to sell the loans to banks, who could 
package and re-package many loans together in special purpose vehicles 
and instruments, and then sell off the payment streams as mortgage-
backed securities into the capital markets.151  Then, as now, the market 
for the downstream products created with the mortgages sought higher 
and higher returns without controlling, structuring, or taking into account, 
the added risk that necessarily accompanied those higher returns.152 
146. Six Years of Low Interest Rates, supra note 14. (“[T]he expectation of prolonged low 
real rates is, as policymakers hoped, edging investors down riskier paths.”). 
147. Six Years of Low Interest Rates, supra note 14. (“This demand for fixed-income
investment has lowered borrowing costs for businesses. . . . Low rates have not just made life 
easier for some consumers and businesses by reducing borrowing costs. They have also 
allowed firms to substitute debt for equity.  This usually boosts earnings per share, which 
makes it an attractive choice for executives motivated by share options.”). 
148. Greg Roumeliotis, Lauren Tara LaCapra & Soyoung Kim, Wall Street Banks Take
Heart from Leveraged Loan Exams, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2014) (“Making junk-rated loans to 
companies is a lucrative, high-margin business for major Wall Street banks. Last year 
leveraged loans generated $1.47 billion in fees in the United States alone.”). 
149. See Antoine Gara, JPMorgan Sees Parallel to Subprime Bust at Regional Banks,
THE STREET (Apr. 8, 2014) (“‘The boom in these loans has been fed by continued surge in 
leveraged loan funds. The genesis of this voracious interest is the search for yield, similar to 
the strong growth in subprime mortgages in 2006-2007,’ Juanuja [of JPMorgan] said.”). 
150. See, e.g., Robin Paul Malloy, U.S. Mortgage Markets: A Tale of Self-correcting
Markets, Parallel Lives and Other People’s Money, THE FUTURE OF FIN. REG. (Eds. Iain 
MacNeil & Justin O’Brien) 40–50, Hart: 2010 (describing the pre-crisis mortgage lending 
market and the effects of government subsidies). 
151. See id.
152. See id. at 48 (“From top to bottom, the housing and the primary and secondary
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Today, many banks are themselves behaving similar to the 
subprime mortgage originators that issued subprime mortgages to less-
qualified borrowers without fearing default, as the loans can be 
syndicated among banks or loan participations can be sold in an active 
and rapidly growing market to investors other than banks.153  Leveraged 
loans are generally arranged by one or a few banks, but the arrangers 
merely negotiate the terms of the loans on behalf of a syndicate of 
investors that actually underwrite the loans.154  Banks therefore have 
every incentive to arrange leveraged loans, as they can collect the 
arrangement fees and then sell off or hedge their own exposure, removing 
some of their skin from the game, just as mortgage originators found 
creative ways to sell off questionable mortgage products that they never 
planned to hold.155 
Market trends suggest that demand by investors for high-yielding 
participations in leveraged loans, and not the credit quality of the 
borrowers, is driving the rapidly growing market.156  For example, Fifth 
Third Bank, N.A. “has grown its leveraged loan syndication volume to 
$5.3 billion in 2013 from $1.2 billion in 2011,” and Regions Financial 
Bank “grew volumes to $4.5 billion from $1.9 billion over the same 
period.”157   
Among the nation’s largest banks, Citigroup has stepped 
up its leveraged loan issuance the fastest, with volumes 
mortgage markets operate on using other people’s money . . . .Consequently, no one has any 
‘skin’ in the game.”). 
153. Mortgage originators are now required to retain some exposure to the mortgages that
they issue unless the mortgage terms and borrowers meet specific underwriting standards.  
See 15 U.S.C. 1639c (2015); Jeffrey R. Favitta, Comment, The Exception that Ate the Rule: 
Why QRM Should Not Equal QM, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 363, 364–70 (2014).  A similar 
retention requirement for leveraged loans, though not included in Dodd-Frank or the 
Guidance, would further encourage banks to limit high-risk loan issuance. 
 154.  See LEVERAGEDLOAN.COM, http://www.leveragedloan.com/primer/#!how-are-
loans-syndicated (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
155. See id. (“The ‘retail’ market for a syndicated loan consists of banks and, in the case
of leveraged transactions, finance companies and institutional investors such as mutual funds, 
structured finance vehicles and hedge funds.”). 
156. See Gara, supra note 149 (“For some regional banks, leveraged loan volumes have
risen three-to-fourfold over the past few years, while the nation’s largest banks have also 
rapidly increased their issuance amid booming LBO markets.”). 
157. See Gara, supra note 149.
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rising 74 percent from 2011 to 2013, and LBO [leveraged 
buyout] underwriting fees the fastest among large banks.  
Bank of America and Wells Fargo have also seen 
issuance rise 30 percent year over year, with leveraged 
loan fees accounting for 33 percent to 38 percent of their 
underwriting fees.158   
Leveraged lending fees and interest are, therefore, becoming a significant 
source of income for banks, as the pool of loans grows rapidly deeper.159  
In addition, increasing activity in mergers and acquisitions, including 
leveraged buyouts, has fueled additional leveraged lending. 
In sum, extended low interest rates have created an economic 
environment in which investors must accept more risk for the same level 
of returns when compared to the period before the 2008 financial crisis.160  
Leveraged loans allow banks to offer higher returns to investors, while 
also allowing companies and their owners the prospect of higher return 
on equity through increased debt in their capital structures.161  Finally, 
banks are willing to arrange more leveraged loans because they are 
confident that they will be able to syndicate the loans to other investors 
and thus leave themselves only minimaly exposed to default and loss 
risks.162  Given the volume of leveraged loans in the market and the 
parallels with the subprime mortgage-backed securities market leading 
158. See Gara, supra note 149. Leveraged buyouts are transactions whereby an acquiring
company (often a private equity-backed company) purchases a target company using mostly 
debt raised by pledging the target company or its assets as collateral. See, e.g., Josh Kosman, 
Why Private Equity Firms Like Bain Really Are the Worst of Capitalism, ROLLING STONE 
(May 23, 2012). “For the most part, issuers undertake leveraged loans for four reasons: [t]o 
support an M&A-related transaction; [t]o back a recapitalization of a company’s balance 
sheet; [t]o refinance debt; [t]o fund general corporate purposes or project finance.” 
LEVERAGEDLOAN.COM, http://www.leveragedloan.com/primer/#!definingleveraged (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2015) (“Debt as a share of total sources of funding for the LBO can range 
from 50% to upwards of 75%.”). 
159. See Gara, supra note 149; see also Rob Tricchinelli, Corporate Debt Liquidity
Problems Pose “Systemic Risk,” Gallagher Says, [2015] BANKING DAILY (BNA) NO. 41 
(Mar. 3, 2015) (“Liquidity problems in corporate debt markets pose a ‘systemic risk’ to the 
financial system, Securities and Exchange Commissioner Daniel Gallagher said March 2.  
Growing issuances of corporate debt paired with a drop in many dealers’ inventory will cause 
widespread trouble if interest rates rise.”). 
160. See supra notes 140 through 145, and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Six Years of Low Interest Rates, supra note 14.
162. See, e.g., Roumeliotis, supra note 148.
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up to the 2008 financial crisis, it is no surprise that regulators have paid 
increasing attention to bank underwriting standards.163  The Guidance 
itself, however, seemed to have little effect on the market until regulators 
began enforcing it with a stern warning to the industry in general and 
issuing MRIA letters for noncompliance during bank examinations.164 
VI. PARTICIPATORY REGULATION – A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
While the Guidance and bank regulators’ subsequent actions now 
seem to be finally reducing risk in the leveraged lending market,165 such 
a delayed response by the market seems risky and unacceptable.  This 
section briefly describes how a self-regulatory body might be more 
effective at shaping banks’ lending practices than external regulatory 
measures like the Guidance. 
A. Regulatory Challenge
Although not required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the Guidance was 
similar to many of the regulatory overhauls since the Dodd-Frank Act in 
that it evolved in a delayed, fragmented, and generalized regulatory 
fashion.166  It is worth noting that the Guidance was issued by all three 
bank regulatory agencies,167 although some regulators sought to enforce 
it more aggressively than others.168  Furthermore, regulators issued the 
Guidance as a mandate without clear metrics, bright line rules or clear 
safe harbors.169 It caused “considerable confusion” regarding 
163. See, e.g., Malloy, supra note 150.
164. See, e.g., Nicolaci de Costa, supra note 105; Tan & Racy, supra note 69; Harrison et
al., supra note 72. 
165. Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16, at 3.
166. See Saule Omarova, The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for a New Age, 15 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 83, 88 (2011) (“The Dodd-Frank Act failed to eliminate the structural basis 
for regulatory arbitrage by retaining the fundamental principle of regulatory fragmentation.”). 
167. The Guidance was issued by the Fed, the OCC, and FDIC. See Interagency Guidance
on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766 (Mar. 22, 2013). 
168. Several news articles and certain changes in league tables (tracking the number and
volume of loans made by major banks) suggest that the OCC was somewhat more zealous in 
implementing the Guidance than the Fed, placing nationally chartered banks at a regulatory 
and market disadvantage. See e.g., LaCapra, supra note 98. 
169. Despite several concerns over the proposed Guidance’s definition of leveraged
lending, regulators made no changes to the definition in the final version.  Interagency 
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expectations and implementation.170  As leveraged lending continued 
apace into 2014, perhaps the most troubling result initially was its 
migration into “shadow banks,” less regulated financial entities beyond 
the bailiwick of the FDIC, OCC, or the Fed.171 
These difficulties in implementation point to a more fundamental 
problem with the present regulatory framework of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
Reliance on a fragmented regulatory approach with a sometimes 
adversarial relationship between regulators and market players is very 
much a product of twentieth century regulatory thinking,172 and 
unsuitable for the complexity of modern U.S. and global financial 
markets.173  Modern markets require “active participation in the 
regulatory process” by the market participants to be regulated, as “a 
purely unilateral command-and-control [regulatory] manner will 
inevitably encounter the fundamental problem of regulatory arbitrage, 
whereby financial institutions find new ways to get around government 
rules.”174 While regulatory arbitrage was, and is, a serious concern, in the 
case of the Guidance, banks were initially incapable of compliance 
because regulators did not make their expectations clear.175 
B. Self-regulation as a Potential Solution
Instead of issuing the Guidance and waiting over eighteen months 
for the Shared National Credits Review to give it scope and substance, 
Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17768. 
170. See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 15.
171. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 103.
172. See Omarova, supra note 167 (“Contrary to popular expectations, the Dodd-Frank
Act largely retained the existing regulatory structure in the financial services sector . . . 
Congress opted against large-scale structural reform.”). 
173. See Omarova, supra note 167, at 92–94 (describing the Volcker Rule and noting
“these new statutory prohibitions rest on an old fiction . . . that the key sources of financial 
risk to banks can be effectively controlled through imposing certain formalistic, institution-
based restrictions . . . . These assumptions tend to over-simplify the dynamics of modern 
financial services businesses.”). 
174. See Saule Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 416 (2011) (noting that such arbitrage creates “a 
never-ending spiral of rulemaking and rule evading” (citing Victor Vleischer, Regulatory 
Arbitrage (U. of Colo. Law Sch. Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-11, 2010, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1567212.)). 
175. See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 15; Braithwaite, supra note 103.
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regulators should have involved market participants more directly to 
secure and leverage their expertise and thus tailor market-stabilizing 
solutions in a more collaborative and effective way.  A more cooperative 
but supervised form of self-regulation would allow market participants 
and regulators to escape the cycle of regulatory arbitrage and provide 
greater and more timely  responsiveness and stability in complex 
financial markets.176  Similar systems have been effective in the securities 
and commodity markets (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange, the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, and the National Futures Association), but no similar self-
regulatory organization (“SRO”) currently exists for the banking 
industry.177 
The most immediate and perhaps simplest solution may be to 
expand the responsibilities and powers of the LSTA to include a self-
regulatory function.178 The LSTA currently “foster[s] cooperation and 
coordination among all loan market participants, facilitating just and 
equitable market principles,” and also serves as an industry advocacy 
group.179  A more robust and empowered version of the organization, with 
government mandates and regulatory oversight, could expand its role to 
become an industry self-regulator.  While a thorough discussion of 
precisely how a more participatory system of “embedded self-regulation” 
would work is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth exploring why 
such a system would be particularly well-suited to deal with the 
regulatory challenge of leveraged lending.180 
First, the relatively limited number of banks engaged in leveraged 
lending already possess the best available information regarding the 
credits they arrange and underwrite. Moreover, they have the most 
176. See Omarova, supra note 175, at 417 (“[T]he dynamics of the twenty-first century
global financial market demand a new approach to industry self-regulation, which has the 
potential to be much more comprehensive and systemic in its scope and operation.”). 
177. See Omarova, supra note 175, at 464–65.
178. See LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING ASSOCIATION, http://www.lsta.org/about.
179. Id.
180. For a thorough discussion of “embedded self-regulation” and “New Governance”
theory, see Omarova, supra note 175. See also John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: 
A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1982); Michael 
Douglas, Federal Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN L.
REV. 171 (1995); Christodoulos Stefanadis, Self-Regulation, Innovation, and the Financial 
Industry, 23 J. REG. ECON. 5 (2003). 
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current and sophisticated understanding of the leveraged lending market 
as a whole.  Both of these factors place them in the best informational 
position to understand the individual risk and the collective risk posed by 
any individual loan or set of credits.181  Second, a self-regulatory body 
would not face the communication challenges that the present adversarial 
and patchwork regulatory structure has created.  As lenders were only 
peripherally involved in the creation and drafting of the Guidance, they 
also had great difficulty in interpreting and implementing it.182  Finally, 
an SRO would be in a position to force participating banks to accept and 
acknowledge responsibility for market failures and the prospect that 
government bailouts and other risk reducing and market stabilizing 
programs are no longer a viable solution to market failures.183 This would 
incentivize market participants to not only establish sound rules and 
guidelines for individual and systemic stability, but also incentivize 
compliance with those guidelines, as opposed to rewarding successful 
avoidance through arbitrage. 
The almost two-year lag between the issuance of the Guidance 
and a measurable reduction of leverage ratios in the leveraged lending 
market reflects the lack of clarity in the market regarding precisely what 
regulators intended or required, as well as the consequences for non-
compliance.184  A more open and collaborative dialogue including both 
regulators and market participants representing both lenders and 
borrowers, or their counsel, might have yielded a clearer understanding 
of regulators’ expectations and a greater appreciation for the basis of their 
concern. Such a process might also incentivize the development and 
implementation of best practices for th market and foster a more level 
playin fields.  For example, instead of leaving banks to define leveraged 
lending individually, regulators might have facilitated an industry 
discussion to craft a uniform definition and thereby provided clearer 
guidelines with industry input, thus eliminating the uncertainty of 
181. See Omarova, supra note 175. (discussing the informational advantages that can be
leveraged by embedded self-regulatory systems in the financial industry). 
182. See supra notes 99 through 108, and accompanying text.
183. See Omarova, supra note 175. (discussing the establishment of a “community of
fate” in the financial industry, whereby each participant understands that the survival of each 
participant is dependent on the viability of the system as a whole). 
184. See supra Part III.
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whether or not a particular credit would be criticized. 
In addition to providing clearer guidance to banks, an established 
industry SRO could also implement uniform standards and compliance.  
A failure to comply with industry guidelines could be corrected both 
more informally and more effectively by other market participants, since 
the major banks generally rely on one another when syndicating both 
leveraged loans and investment grade loans.  If a bank earned a reputation 
for pushing the envelope in leveraged deals, a SRO might have the ability 
to discourage other banks from helping the offending institution to 
syndicate such deals, and even the threat of such a sanction would have 
to be taken at least as seriously as the MRIA letter that Credit Suisse 
received in September 2014. 
Finally, an established SRO would function with more accurate 
and current information than external regulators.  By definition, an 
external regulator must expend significant resources to understand and 
react to the market from the outside looking in, while a self-regulatory 
body would already have a sophisticated understanding of the lending 
market.  Market trends in lender protections and borrower flexibility can 
change relatively quickly, and it makes little sense to have regulators 
duplicate the work that market participants must do to negotiate and 
syndicate the loans in the first place.  In the case of the Guidance, an SRO 
could have monitored leveraged lending internally on a real time and 
ongoing basis without having to wait for an annual Shared National 
Credits Report.  Arguably, such a regulator would also act more 
proactively out of an interest in preserving the market’s autonomy and 
vibrancy, especially if it were clear that the options for market 
participants were to either effectively regulate themselves or be excluded 
from or restricted in the market and thus lose substantial influence and 
market share. 
VII. CONCLUSION
While there are some indications that the Guidance is beginning 
to curb risk in the syndicated leveraged loan market, the process has not 
been a smooth or timely one. The Guidance provided some insight into 
regulators’ expectations, but it was not until the subsequent publication 
of the 2014 Shared National Credits Review that banks had any real 
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clarity regarding how the Guidance was to be implemented and applied. 
Furthermore, significant market forces continue to incentivize the kind of 
risky lending practices that the Guidance was intended to discourage.  
This problem is symptomatic of the present regulatory structure, and a 
self-regulatory framework could provide more effective individual bank 
and systemic risk management. 
